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LAW SUMMARY
The Employees' Decade: Recent




The law of unintended consequences provides that any action by people
or the government will have effects that are unanticipated and unintended.'
Yet, a failure to recognize this principle is generally not the problem. The
problem is the impossibility of determining the scope of those effects from
the outset - how much will those unintended effects adversely impact the
actual intended effects of the statute. This concept undoubtedly lingers in the
minds of legislatures during the drafting of a bill and the enactment of law.
How will the court interpret these provisions? How will that interpretation
impact businesses in Missouri? In light of these hard, if not impossible, ques-
tions, it is likely the long-term reaction and adaptation to those inevitable
unintended effects that matters the most.
Over the past decade, the Missouri Human Rights Act (MHRA) has
been extensively subjected to the law of unintended consequences. Federal
and state courts have disagreed about the Act's application, and its provisions
have even clashed with Missouri's constitution.2 The effects of these discre-
pancies have greatly expanded the protections afforded to employees as well
as employees' ability to recover for actions invading those protections. This
resulting expansion has exponentially increased the exposure of employers to
liability, thus increasing the cost of doing business in Missouri. This, of
course, is logically and inevitably passed to customers. 3 One could argue,
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however, that expense is not a factor in the Missouri legislature's efforts to
reduce discrimination. But, since it ultimately appears that no amount of
workplace training and selective hiring can fully eliminate the presence of
workplace discrimination, properly balancing the competing interests of the
employer in doing business with the public policy of reducing discrimination
becomes exceedingly significant.
This Note will identify the considerable changes and varying interpreta-
tions of the MHRA over the last decade, analyze the optimal balance between
the competing, important interests, and determine any potential need for
amendment, including consideration of the various proposals currently before
the legislature. Part 11 thus analyzes the four major areas of difficulty in the
adjudication of MHRA claims in the last decade, including jury trials, availa-
ble damages, the burden of proof, and individual liability. Next, Part III re-
cognizes the most recent developments under the MHRA. And lastly, Part IV
involves a two-part discussion beginning with the policy and effect behind
each area of difficulty, and it concludes with an analysis of the Act as a
whole, including its place among other relevant discrimination statutes such
as Title VII.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
In 1961, the Missouri General Assembly enacted the MHRA with the
general purpose of providing Missouri employees with a statutory right of
action against employers concerning various forms of workplace discrimina-
tion.4 Antedating the current prevailing federal discrimination statutory re-
gime by three years, the MIRA is not merely a state-level counterpart to
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII). 5 The two statutes have
been described as "coextensive, but not identical," and the MHRA as "broad-
er than Title VII, and in other ways . . . more restrictive."6 However, because
lower Missouri courts read Missouri law in conjunction with consistent feder-
al employment discrimination case law during the interpretation and applica-
tion of the Act, there is much overlap and similarity between the two.7 Re-
(2003) ("[D]iscrimination[] claims are now like accidents - a cost of doing business,
which necessarily implies that a certain level of discrimination will persist.").
4. Erin C. Hansen, State ex rel. Diehl v. O'Malley Breaks Down the Wall: The
Right to a Jury Trial in State Court Under the Missouri Human Rights Act, 59 J. Mo.
B. 296, 297 (2003) (discussing the purpose of the Act); see also Mo. REV. STAT. §§
213.010-.137 (2000).
5. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000el7 (2006) (proscrib-
ing employment discrimination based upon race, color, religion, sex, or national ori-
gin).
6. Brady v. Curators of Univ. of Mo., 213 S.W.3d 101, 112-13 (Mo. App. E.D.
2006) (emphasis omitted).
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gardless of any such federal influence, the interpretive process always begins
with an analysis of the Act itself.
A. The Relevant Provisions of the A4IRA
Section 213.055.1 of the MHRA prohibits an employer from discrimi-
nating against an individual on the basis of "race, color, religion, national
origin, sex, ancestry, age or disability." This protection encompasses
workplace actions concerning discharge, refusal to hire, compensation, em-
ployee or applicant classification, and any terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment.9 A separate provision also makes it unlawful to "aid, abet, in-
cite, compel, or coerce the commission" of the prohibited acts and forbids
retaliation or discrimination against those who oppose any proscribed actions
or file complaints under the Act.10 As with many statutes, the MHRA con-
tains terms of art which are separately defined within the Act.1
By the clear language of the statute, liability for taking such actions un-
der section 213.055.1 can be imposed on those considered to be an "employ-
er."' 2 The provision specifically defines an "employer" as "any person em-
ploying six or more persons within the state, and any person directly acting in
the interest of an employer."' 3 This definition includes the State of Missouri
and any included civil or political subdivision, but expressly excludes reli-
gious or sectarian-owned and -operated corporations and associations.14 Lat-
er identified within the definition of employer, a "person" is defined as "one
or more individuals, corporations, partnerships, associations, organizations, . .
[and] other organized groups of persons."
Beyond the substantive provisions granting employees statutory rights,
the Act also has many procedural aspects. The basic framework of adjudicat-
ing claims is as follows. Upon a believed violation of the Act by an employ-
er's actions, an employee must first file a verified complaint with the Mis-
souri Commission on Human Rights (the Commission) within 180 days in
order to pursue relief.16 The employee is then presented with two possible
8. Mo. REV. STAT. § 213.055.1(1) (2000).
9. Id. § 213.055.1(1)-(3).
10. Id. § 213.070(1)-(2).
11. Id. § 213.010.
12. See id. § 213.055.1(1).
13. Id. § 213.010(7).
14. Id.
15. Id. § 213.010(14).
16. Id. § 213.075.1. The complaint must state the particulars of the unlawful
discriminatory practice as well as the name and address of the person(s) accused of
committing such acts. Id. The Act also permits complaints to be filed with other
commissions that are substantially equivalent to the Commission or with which the
Commission has certain agreements, such as the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC). Id § 213.075.2.
2010] 1351
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options: (1) the claim can either be determined through the administrative
process available through the Commission 7 or (2) the employee can wait 180
days after filing the complaint and request a right-to-sue letter, which is
granted so long as a determination by the Commission is still pending., If
the employee chooses the latter route, the aggrieved employee has ninety
days to bring suit under the Act against the relevant employer(s).'9 Reaching
state or federal court, however, gives rise to a plethora of hurdles and consid-
erations for the plaintiff-employee.
B. Procedural Aspects: Jury Trial and Damages
For the vast majority of the MHRA's existence, any claim brought under
the Act was necessarily decided by bench trial while in state court; no jury
trial was permitted.20 The state court rule remained regardless of the fact that
the right to a jury trial in federal court is wholly a matter of procedural law
under the Erie doctrine and, therefore, federal law concerning a jury con-
trolled in diversity actions or otherwise.21 This disparity resulted in a com-
mon practice of employment attorneys bringing simultaneous actions under
both the MHRA and an applicable federal discrimination act - such as Title
VII,22 the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990,23 or the Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment Act of 1967.24 The federal question presented would
provide supplemental jurisdiction for the MHRA action,25 permitting initia-
tion in or removal to federal court due to the inherent "same case or contro-
versy" resulting from the identical instance of alleged discriminatory con-
17. See id. § 213.075.3.
18. Id. § 213.111.1.
19. Id. The action must also be brought within two years of the alleged discri-
minatory event's occurrence or reasonable discovery. Id. For a discussion of the
remedies available under the MHRA, see discussion infra Part II.B.
20. See, e.g., State ex rel. Tolbert v. Sweeney, 828 S.W.2d 929, 932 (Mo. App.
S.D. 1992), overruled by State ex rel. Diehl v. O'Malley, 95 S.W.3d 82 (Mo. 2003)
(en banc). The original version of the MHRA provided that "[a]ny party" could re-
quest a jury trial. Id. at 930-3 1. But in 1965, the Missouri General Assembly re-
moved the option for a jury trial from section 296.050. Id. at 931.
21. Sullivan v. Curators of Univ. of Mo., 808 F. Supp. 1420, 1424 (E.D. Mo.
1992); see also Simler v. Conner, 372 U.S. 221, 222 (1963) ("Only through a holding
that the jurytrial [sic] right is to be determined according to federal law can the un-
iformity in its exercise which is demanded by the Seventh Amendment be
achieved.").
22. See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text.
23. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12117 (2006).
24. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2006).
25. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2006).
1352 [Vol. 75
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duct.26 Of course, an out-of-state defendant could also obtain jurisdiction
through diversity.27 Since 2003, many of these procedural strategies are now
unnecessary to accomplish the goals desired by the plaintiff.
In 2003, the Supreme Court of Missouri decided State ex rel. Diehl v.
28O'Malley, which drastically altered the adjudication of MHRA actions in
Missouri courts. In Diehl, the plaintiff filed a charge against NASD Regula-
tion, Inc. for age and sex discrimination as well as retaliation for eventual
termination due to those complaints. 29 After the 180-day waiting period, the
plaintiff Diehl requested a "right to sue letter" and brought action in state
court seeking a jury trial. 30 Following clear precedent, Judge O'Malley over-
ruled the motion.3 In response, Diehl sought a writ of prohibition, which the
Supreme Court of Missouri granted and made absolute, requiring trial of the
32
case before a jury.
Before granting the writ, the court undertook an extensive historical
analysis concerning the right to a jury trial in actions for damages.33 Looking
to the Missouri Constitution, the court interpreted the meaning of the consti-
tutional right to a jury trial "as heretofore enjoyed."34 Once the point of ref-
erence for the constitution was deemed to be 1820 - the date the Missouri
Constitution was adopted - the sole issue centered on the extent of the right to
a jury trial at that time.3s Because the right was available for all actions seek-
ing pecuniary damages in 1820, the same right was held to be constitutionally
mandated for all claims that can be analogized to claims properly before a
court at common law (distinguished from those in equity) in 1820.36 Accor-
dingly, the court held that claims under the MHRA for monetary damages
provide a constitutional right to a jury trial.37
The Diehl decision, while encompassing the issue of the right to a jury
trial for monetary damages, left many issues unanswered. One such issue
concerned whether a plaintiff could seek equitable relief in the same action as
that seeking legal relief before a jury. In State ex rel. Leonardi v. Sherry, the
Supreme Court of Missouri resolved the issue in the affirmative. 38 The court
26. Paul D. Seyferth & Joseph H. Knittig, A Conflict of Balances: The Adjudica-
tion of Missouri Human Rights Act Claims in Federal Court, 63 Mo. L. REV. 307,
314-15 (1998) (providing a more in-depth analysis of the process).
27. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
28. 95 S.W.3d 82 (Mo. 2003) (en banc).




33. Id. at 84-89.
34. Id. at 84-85.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 85-86.
37. Id. at 88.
38. 137 S.W.3d 462, 473 (Mo. 2004) (en banc).
2010]1 1353
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held that legal claims could be tried by jury while the court simultaneously
determined those in equity, unless the circumstances required otherwise.
Upon an exercise of the right to a jury trial, the full array of damages
available under the Act40 is available for jury consideration. Unlike the
capped damages for discrimination under Title VII,4 1 the MHRA permits the
42
recovery of compensatory and punitive damages, without any caps. This
was not always the case. Before the 1986 amendment to the MHRA that
limited adjudication to bench trials by removing the right to a jury, the Act
did not allow punitive damages; a balance was struck between available dam-
ages and the availability of a jury trial in the new Act.43 Beyond the issue of
compensatory and punitive damages, however, the plaintiff can also recover
the typical damages available in cases before a jury, such as damages for
mental pain and suffering." Similar to other discrimination statutes, potential
relief under the MH-RA includes that which is "deem[ed] appropriate," such
as back pay, attorneys' fees and costs, and specific performance. 45 Just as the
Diehl decision altered the balance of the Act, other changes in the last decade
also altered the scales.
C. The Daugherty Standard
From 1984 to 2007, MHIRA claims were litigated in a framework nearly
46identical to that used by federal courts for employment discrimination. The
federal approach varies depending upon a plaintiffs production of direct evi-
dence or circumstantial evidence of discrimination.4 7 If presented with direct
evidence - that which establishes "a specific link between the [alleged] dis-
39. Id.
40. Mo. REV. STAT. § 213.111 (2000).
41. The available compensatory and punitive damages under Title VII are
capped anywhere between $50,000 and $300,000, depending on the employer size.
42 U.S.C. § 198la(b)(3) (2006). This cap effectively creates a balance: plaintiffs can
bring their claims before a sympathetic jury, but that jury does not have unfettered
discretion in awarding damages. See Seyferth & Knittig, supra note 26, at 313-14.
42. Mo. REV. STAT. § 213.111.2.
43. Compare Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 296.010-.070 (1978) (repealed 1986), with Mo.
REV. STAT. §§ 213.010-.070 (2000).
44. See H.S. v. Bd. of Regents, Se. Mo. State Univ., 967 S.W.2d 665, 673 (Mo.
App. E.D. 1998) ("Cases interpreting [section 213.111.2] have repeatedly held that
awards ... may include damages for emotional distress.").
45. Mo. REV. STAT. § 213.111.2.
46. See, e.g., Daugherty v. City of Maryland Heights, 231 S.W.3d 814, 818 (Mo.
2007) (en banc); Midstate Oil Co. v. Mo. Comm'n on Human Rights, 679 S.W.2d
842, 845 (Mo. 1984) (en banc) (expressly adopting the federal employment discrimi-
nation analytical framework).
47. See Putman v. Unity Health Sys., 348 F.3d 732, 734 (8th Cir. 2003).
1354 [Vol. 75
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criminatory animus and the challenged decision"AS - sufficient to show "that
an illegitimate criterion was a motivating factor in the employer's decision to
terminate [his or her] employment," the court will provide a mixed-motive
instruction.49 This mixed-motive instruction signals a shift in the burden of
persuasion to the employer, who must then prove that it would have made the
same adverse decision regardless of the illegitimate criterion.50
The presentation of evidence that is circumstantial, on the other hand,
gives rise to the much-debated framework set out in McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green.51 The burden-shifting analysis set out in McDonnell Douglas
Corp. requires that a plaintiff first establish a prima facie case of discrimina-
tion, the elements of which vary depending on the claim. 52 Upon satisfying
the first prong, which creates a presumption of discrimination, the burden of
production shifts to the employer to proffer a legitimate, non-discriminatory
reason behind the adverse action.53 The burden of persuasion, however, re-
mains with the plaintiff at all times; the court does not analyze credibility. 54
If the employer's production of evidence is sufficient, the presumption will
fall away and the plaintiff will regain the full burden to show that the stated
reasons are merely pretext for the discriminatory action.55  Each of these
steps, in order, occurs before the case can even reach a jury, and the single
issue before the fact-finder is whether the employer discriminated against the
employee.
The use of the McDonnell Douglas framework to analyze MHRA claims
in Missouri courts was widespread and frequently praised 57 until State ex rel.
48. Philipp v. ANR Freight Sys., Inc., 61 F.3d 669, 673 (8th Cir. 1995) (citing
Stacks v. Sw. Bell Yellow Pages, Inc., 996 F.2d 200, 202 n.1 (8th Cir. 1993)).
49. Id. (citing Cram v. Lamson & Sessions, Co., 49 F.3d 466, 471 (8th Cir.
1995)).
50. Id
51. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
52. Id. at 802. Regardless of the type of discrimination alleged, each prima facie
case includes common requirements: the plaintiff must suffer an adverse job action,
the plaintiff must be a member of a protected group, and the employer's action must
be based upon an illegal factor. Id.
53. Id
54. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142-43 (2000).
55. Id.
56. Bowen v. Celotex Corp., 292 F.3d 565, 566 (8th Cir. 2002) ("A factfinder's
Title VII verdict cannot be based upon a plaintiffs failure to produce evidence of a
prima facie case or pretext because these burdens of production 'drop out' when a
case is submitted for a verdict." (quoting United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors
v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715 (1983))).
57. See, e.g., Midstate Oil Co. v. Mo. Comm'n on Human Rights, 679 S.W.2d
842, 845-46 (Mo. 1984) (en banc) ("[T]his approach offers 'a sensible, orderly way to
evaluate the evidence . . . .' (citation omitted)); H.S. v. Bd. of Regents, Se. Mo. State
Univ., 967 S.W.2d 665, 670 (Mo. App. E.D. 1998) ("The framework is used to pro-
2010] 1355
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Diehl v. O'Malley, which, as discussed above, permitted jury trials under the
MHRA.5 This, in turn, led to the resulting promulgation of Missouri Ap-
proved Instruction (MAI) 31.24. 5 MAI 31.24 instructs the jury to find for
the plaintiff if, first, the defendant committed the alleged action, second, the
specific protected classification was a contributing factor in such action, and
third, the conduct caused damage to the plaintiff.60 Problematically, the fed-
eral approach to employment discrimination was focused on whether the dis-
puted employment action was motivated by an illegitimate purpose.61 The
plaintiff essentially needed to prove that the adverse action was motivated by
discrimination in order to survive summary judgment so that a jury could find
that it was merely a contributing factor.
The contradiction and divergence between the standard provided in MAI
31.24 and that used in the federal discrimination framework resulted in the
adoption of a new standard for Missouri in Daugherty v. City of Maryland
Heights.62 In Daugherty, the City of Maryland Heights (the City) terminated
the plaintiff from his position as police captain at the age of fifty-nine.63 Be-
fore his rise to police captain, plaintiff Daugherty suffered injuries on the job
that eventually led to degenerative disk disease, resulting in his excessive use
of sick leave. The violation of the sick leave policy prompted the City to
submit Daugherty to a doctor-administered examination to determine his
physical capability of performing the job duties of police captain. Despite
the doctor's clearance of Daugherty to perform as police captain, the stated
cause for termination was the doctor's finding of incapability to perform
front-line officer duties. 66 After being terminated, Daugherty met with his
supervisor - who was also his brother-in-law - to have a discussion.67 During
the taped discussion, the supervisor stated that the City wanted to make a
reduction in employees over fifty-five years old to save money and agreed
that this constituted age discrimination.6 8 The supervisor later gave deposi-
gressively sharpen the inquiry into the question of whether intentional discrimination
has occurred.").
58. See discussion supra Part II.B.
59. See Daugherty v. City of Maryland Heights, 231 S.W.3d 814, 819 (Mo.
2007) (en banc) ("[T]his Court's 2003 decision holding that jury trials are available
under the MHRA, followed by the adoption of... MAI 31.24 ....
60. Mo. APPROVED JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 31.24 (2005).
61. See, e.g., Midstate Oil Co., 679 S.W.2d at 845.
62. 231 S.W.3d 814.
63. Id. at 816.
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tion testimony discounting his statements, characterizing them as attempts to
pacify his brother-in-law. 69
Daugherty brought claims against the City under the MHRA for age and
disability discrimination. 70 When the City sought summary judgment on
those claims, the trial court granted the motion and entered judgment in favor
of the City, finding that the plaintiff "failed to establish a prima facie case."71
Daugherty appealed the adverse judgment, arguing that genuine issues of
material fact existed concerning whether age or disability were contributing
72factors in the cause of termination - the standard set out in MAI 31.24. In
analyzing the appeal, the Supreme Court of Missouri noted that the MHRA's
definition of discrimination included "any unfair treatment" based upon a
protected status.73 By interpreting the plain meaning of the Act, the court
found that it did not require that "discrimination [be] a substantial or deter-
mining factor in an employment decision;" the discrimination could merely
contribute to the decision.74 Since MAI 31.24 was consistent with this con-
clusion, the court agreed with Daugherty and held that claims under the
MHRA will "survive summary judgment if there is a genuine issue of materi-
al fact as to whether [the protected status of the plaintiff] was a 'contributing
factor"' to the defendant's adverse employment action. The case was re-
76
versed and remanded for a trial on the merits.
Since Daugherty, federal and state courts analyzing employment dis-
crimination claims under the MHRA no longer use the federal McDonnell
Douglas framework.77 If the plaintiff presents sufficient evidence to create a
genuine issue of material fact concerning whether discrimination was a con-
tributing factor in the employment action, it will be submitted to the fact-
finder in conjunction with MAI 31.24 for a verdict.78 But the adoption of the
Daugherty standard did not signal the end of significant change to the litiga-
tion of MHRA claims in the last decade.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 817-18.
72. Id. at 819-20.
73. Id. at 819 (citing Mo. REV. STAT. § 213.010(5) (2000)).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 820.
76. Id. at 825.
77. See, e.g., Wallace v. DTG Operations, Inc., 563 F.3d 357, 360 (8th Cir.
2009) (recognizing and applying the Daugherty standard instead of the McDonnell
Douglas framework for MHRA claims).
78. See ITT Commercial Fin. Corp. v. Mid-Am Marine Supply Corp., 854
S.W.2d 371, 376 (Mo. 1993) (en banc) ("Summary judgment is [appropriate] ...
where the moving party has demonstrated, on the basis of facts as to which there is no
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D. Interpretations of "Employer": Individual Liability?
As described previously, section 213.010 of the MHRA defines an em-
ployer as "any person employing six or more persons within the state, and
any person directly acting in the interest of an employer." 79 It is unquestion-
able and undisputed that the stereotypical corporation or organization is in-
cluded in this definition; however, it has been less clear whether a supervisor
or manager can be individually liable under the Act.80 The first courts to
address this question were federal, which could only attempt to predict what
the Supreme Court of Missouri's decision on the issue might be.8'
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in Lenhardt v. Basic
Institute of Technology, Inc. first decided the issue in 1995, holding that the
Supreme Court of Missouri would likely interpret section 213.010 as not al-
lowing recovery against individuals.82 In making the decision, the court rea-
soned that the Supreme Court of Missouri would look to similar statutes for
guidance, such as Title VII.83 While recognizing that the definition of em-
ployer under Title VH184 differs from that under the MHRA, the court rea-
soned that the interpretation by many federal courts for solely respondeat
superior liability under Title VII's "any agent of such a person" would ana-
logically preclude individual liability under MHRA's "any person directly
acting in the interest of an employer." 85
Most subsequent decisions by lower federal courts followed the holding
of Lenhardt as binding precedent. However, cases in both the U.S. District
Courts for the Eastern and Western Districts of Missouri displayed some hesi-
tancy. For example, in Hill v. Ford Motor Co., the Eastern District refused to
follow Lenhardt by downplaying its authoritativeness and determining that
79. Mo. REV. STAT. § 213.010(7) (2000).
80. See Richard D. Worth, Note, No "Free Pass "for Employees: Missouri Says
"Yes" to Individual Liability Under the Missouri Human Rights Act, 72 Mo. L. REV.
947, 948 (2007).
81. See Hazen v. Pasley, 768 F.2d 226, 228 (8th Cir. 1985) ("Where neither the
legislature nor the highest court in a state has addressed an issue, the federal court
must determine what the highest state court would probably hold were it called upon
to decide the issue.").
82. 55 F.3d 377, 381 (8th Cir. 1995).
83. Id. at 380-81.
84. Title VII defines an "employer" as "a person engaged in an industry affecting
commerce who has fifteen or more employees ... and any agent of such a person."
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2006).
85. Lenhardt, 55 F.3d at 379-80.
86. See Worth, supra note 80, at 947 n.2 (compiling a non-exhaustive list of
federal courts following the decision in Lenhardt).
[Vol. 751358
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the Supreme Court of Missouri would hold in favor of individual liability. 87
Moreover, the Western District, although ultimately following Lenhardt, dis-
played reluctance in Baines v. Missouri Gaming Co. by explicitly pointing
out that any agreement or disagreement with the Eighth Circuit was imma-
terial due to stare decisis.8 8
The Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District was the first Missouri
state court to rule on the issue of individual liability in Cooper v. Albacore
Holdings, Inc.89 In Cooper, the plaintiff brought MHRA claims for sexual
harassment and retaliation against the defendants Albacore Holdings, Inc. and
Gordon Quick, the CEO of the company.9 0 The trial court granted the motion
for summary judgment brought by the defendants, and the plaintiff ap-
pealed.I On appeal, the court rejected the holding of Lenhardt and allowed
individual liability to be pursued against defendant Quick.9 2 In making this
decision, the court looked to the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA)
instead of Title VII, because the FMLA directly mirrors the definition of em-
ployer under the MHRA . By making comparisons under the FMLA, the
court joined other courts to hold that the language "in the interest of an em-
ployer" plainly includes individual liability. 94 Ultimately, this decision was
reaffirmed by the Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District in Brady v.
Curators of University of Missouri.95
III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Despite the considerable amount of changes that occurred to the adjudi-
cation of MHRA claims in the early part of the decade, many interpretations
of the Act had yet to be conclusively settled or even discovered. Several re-
cent decisions from the Supreme Court of Missouri have provided additional
certainty and clarity for those bringing claims under the Act.96 However, it is
impossible to predict all of the potential changes to the Act resulting from the
interpretive process in the federal and state judiciary, let alone the legislature.
87. 324 F. Supp. 2d 1028, 1032 (E.D. Mo. 2004). This case is not to be con-
flated with the Supreme Court of Missouri case of Hill v. Ford Motor Co., 277
S.W.3d 659 (Mo. 2009) (en banc), which is discussed in Part Ill.A, infra.
88. No. 05-6031-CV-SJ-FJG, 2006 WL 506184, at *2 (W.D. Mo. Feb. 28, 2006).
89. 204 S.W.3d 238 (Mo. App. E.D. 2006).
90. Id. at 240.
91. Id. at 241-42.
92. Id. at 244.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. 213 S.W.3d 101, 113 (Mo. App. E.D. 2006).
96. See discussion infra Part III.A-C.
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A. Individual Liability: Employers Under the Act
In light of the Cooper holding, much of the discrepancy between the
federal courts was resolved because federal courts are generally required to
follow the decisions of state intermediate appellate courts when applying state
law.97 However, federal courts are not absolutely bound by state intermediate
appellate decisions - the decisions can be disregarded if the court is con-
vinced by persuasive data that the Supreme Court of Missouri would hold
otherwise.9 8 In addition, there was always the possibility that the Missouri
Court of Appeals, Western District would hold oppositely, recreating and
escalating the once-existing debacle. The Supreme Court of Missouri's hold-
ing in Hill v. Ford Motor Co. avoided these possibilities. 99
In Hill, the plaintiff was a "floater" 00 for the Ford Motor Company
(Ford) and was at times under the supervision of Kenny Hune.10 During
these periods, Hune would ask the plaintiff, Hill, sexually related questions
such as whether she wore zebra prints to reflect her animal instincts and about
the details of her bra.1 02 In addition, Hune would make various sexual ad-
vances towards Hill and other female employees. 0 3 When Hill and other
female employees presented this activity to their group leader, the group
leader informed Hune's supervisor, Maurice Woods. 104 Hill was asked by
Woods to identify permanent positions that were available and Woods ulti-
mately assigned her to a position under Hune. 0 5 This created great tension
between Hune and Hill, and Hune initially refused to permit her to work.106
According to Hill, Hune approached her aggressively when she began to
work, causing her to raise up her safety glasses, to which Hune responded by
hostilely reprimanding her for violating a safety precaution.' 07 When discus-
sions about the incident began within labor relations, the labor relations su-
pervisor, Edds, required Hill to seek psychiatric help and ordered a three-day
suspension, during which Hune was terminated.1os Hill eventually filed com-
plaints with the EEOC and the Commission for a hostile work environment
resulting from sexual harassment and retaliation for reporting the discrimina-
97. Comm'r v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 465 (1967).
98. See id.
99. 277 S.W.3d 659 (Mo. 2009) (en banc).
100. "Floater" is a term referring to an employee who moves from job to job with-











Missouri Law Review, Vol. 75, Iss. 4 [2010], Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol75/iss4/7
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS UNDER THE MIRA
tion and previously filing discrimination complaints.109 The complaint, as
filed, was only against Ford."10
Upon receiving a right to sue letter, Hill brought claims against Ford,
Hune, and Edds.1' The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of
Ford and Edds on each of their purported violations, and Hill appealed.11 2
The Supreme Court of Missouri first determined that Daugherty was indeed
the standard for sexual harassment and retaliation claims." 3  Under the
Daugherty standard, the court determined that issues of material fact existed
and therefore reversed and remanded the case.114
Next, the court addressed whether Edds, as the labor relations supervi-
sor, could be individually liable under the Act.'15 The court analyzed how the
lower appellate courts in Cooper and Brady decided the individual liability
issue.l16 Agreeing with Cooper and Brady, the court found the "plain and
unambiguous" definition of employer to include individual liability." 7  In
essence, the "statute is clear" that the MHRA reaches "any person acting
directly in the interest of the employer," including a supervisory employee. 1 8
Lastly, the court entertained Edds' argument that he was precluded from lia-
bility due to the failure to include him in the complaint filed with the EEOC
or the Commission.119 Since no state decision was on point, analogous feder-
al law provided guidance.120 Federal decisions on the matter generally re-
quired individuals to be named in the original charge in order to later be
sued. 12 This requirement gives notice to the party as well as provides an
opportunity for the party to voluntarily comply with the proceedings; howev-
er, some cases have permitted claims when these considerations are absent.122
Since the trial court did not weigh these considerations in its grant of sum-
mary judgment, the court remanded the issue for determination.123
109. Id. at 664.
110. Id
111. Id
112. Id at 661 & n.1.
113. Id at 664-65.
114. Id at 662.
115. Id. at 669.
116. Id.
117. Id. (quoting Cooper v. Albacore Holdings Inc., 204 S.W.3d 238, 244 (Mo.
App. E.D. 2006); Brady v. Curators of Univ. of Mo., 213 S.W.3d 101, 113 (Mo. App.
E.D. 2006)).





123. Id. at 670.
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B. Constructive Discharge and Continuing Violations
As identified in Part II.A, the MHRA specifically requires that a charge
be filed "within [180] days of the alleged act of discrimination." 2 4 Yet, there
may not always be a clear point when the discrimination culminates into a
well-defined adverse employment action. Moreover, the provision provides
no insight into situations where the employee is effectively forced out due to
discriminatory practices - i.e., a "constructive discharge." The recent case of
Wallingsford v. City ofMaplewood provides valuable insight on both.125
In Wallingsford, the plaintiff was a police officer for the City of Maple-
wood from 1986 until 2004, when she resigned. 126 In 2005, Wallingsford
filed a charge of discrimination with the Commission, alleging retaliation,
hostile work environment, gender discrimination, and intentional infliction of
emotional distress, and she eventually received a right-to-sue letter.127 As
part of the allegations, Wallingsford claimed that she experienced abusive
behavior, promotion denials, sham evaluations, and baseless internal investi-
gations throughout her employment until her constructive discharge.128 Upon
Maplewood's motion, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of
Maplewood on the ground that the charge was not filed within 180 days of an
alleged act of discrimination.129 Wallingsford appealed the ruling.130
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Missouri detailed the "continuing vi-
olation" exception to the 180-day filing requirement, stating that the plaintiff
can recover for discriminatory acts prior to the 180-day requirement if they
are part of a series of interrelated events.131 Therefore, the only issue was
whether Wallingsford alleged a single discriminatory event occurring less
than 180 days before her complaint and not whether all events occurred with-
in the 180-day period.132 Since constructive discharge 33 is recognized as a
discriminatory action under the Act, Wallingsford did allege a discriminatory
event that occurred less than 180 days before filing her charge.134 The judg-
ment was reversed and the case remanded for the trial court to consider the
124. Mo. REV. STAT. § 213.075.1 (2000).
125. 287 S.W.3d 682 (Mo. 2009) (en banc).
126. Id at 684.
127. Id at 684-85.





133. An employee is constructively discharged when "an employer deliberately
renders an employee's working conditions so intolerable that the employee is forced
to quit his or herjob." Id. at 686.
134. Id. at 685-86.
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genuine issue of material fact: whether Wallingsford was constructively dis-
charged in violation of the Act. 135
C. Potential Changes to the MFIRA
While changes from the judiciary can be both swift and cumulative, it
can all be undone in an instant. The legislature is the ever-looming branch in
our tripartite system that can refine, rework, or repeal any statute or act that is
not effectuating results as intended. With numerous legislative proposals and
amendments occurring in the last decade, this legislative process is no stran-
ger to the MHRA, and support for potential amendments is gaining renewed
strength in light of the most recent applications of the Act. 136 Therefore, un-
derstanding the proposals to the MHRA before the Missouri House of Repre-
sentatives and the Missouri Senate is important.' 37
For the years 2009 and 2010, three bills arose before the Senatel3 and
six before the House of Representatives1 39 that proposed changes to the
MHRA. Some of the bills focused solely on specific claims under the Act,
such as sexual orientation discrimination, 140 while others proposed a more
comprehensive change to the statutory framework.141 While none of these
proposed amendments passed, they are indicative of the continual efforts to
amend the Act, some of which have been successful in the past. As referred
135. Id. at 687.
136. See infra notes 138-50 and accompanying text.
137. Equally important is an understanding of the legislative process in Missouri.
All laws initially begin as proposed bills in either the House or the Senate. See How a
Bill Becomes a Law, http://www.senate.mo.gov/bill-law.htm (last visited Oct. 1,
2010). These bills, drafted by or at the request of a legislator, are "introduced" and
read before the applicable governmental body. Id Following the reading, each bill is
sent to a committee, which can take a variety of actions. Id. If a favorable action is
taken by the committee, the bill is placed on a "perfection calendar" that can include
amendments, eventually leading to a perfected and printed bill. Id. The perfected bill
is then presented before the originating house. Id. It requires a constitutional majori-
ty (eighteen for the Senate, eighty-two for the House) to pass. Id. If passed, it is sent
to the other house for a similar process; if the bill is "truly agreed to and finally
passed," it is signed and sent to the Governor for signing or veto. Id
138. See S. 852, 95th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2010); S. 626, 95th Gen.
Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2010); S. 109, 95th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo.
2009).
139. See H.R. 1850, 95th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2010); H.R. 1488,
95th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2010); H.R. 799, 95th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg.
Sess. (Mo. 2009); H.R. 701, 95th Gen. Assem., Ist Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2009); H.R. 582,
95th Gen. Assem., Ist Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2009); H.R. 227, 95th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg.
Sess. (Mo. 2009).
140. See H.R. 1850; S. 626; H.R. 701; H.R. 582; S. 109 (identical to S. 626).
141. See, e.g., S. 852 (seeking to repeal and reenact sections concerning employee
definitions, the analytical standards, damages, and interpretive standards).
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to previously, the Act was amended in 1986 to remove the right to a jury trial
and to provide for the possibility of punitive damages.142 Without discussing
the proposals to amend specific discrimination claims under the Act, each
remaining bill is relatively comprehensive and provides a different perspec-
tive on the various balances that are possible.
House Bill 1488 removes from the section 213.010 definition of em-
ployer "any person . . . acting in the interest of the employer," which was
interpreted to give rise to individual liability. 143 In addition, the bill expressly
abrogates Daugherty and its progeny as well as eliminates MAI 31.24 and
31.25, which provide for the motivating standard analysis.14 4 The bill, if
enacted, would direct courts to again look at the McDonnell Douglas frame-
work as a "highly persuasive framework for analysis." 4 5 The bill, in stark
contrast to the uncapped damages available under the current Act, also pro-
vides for capped compensatory and punitive damages varying from $50,000
to $300,000, depending on the size of the employer.146 Senate Bill 852 and
House Bill 799 provide similar changes.14 7
On the other hand, House Bill 227 presents a different package of
change. As with each comprehensive bill presented, the bill does not attempt
to modify the availability of jury trials under the MIRA.148 Similar to the
bills previously introduced, Bill 227 abrogates Daugherty in favor of a moti-
vating standard as well as removes the provision in the definition of employer
that provides individual liability.149 However, Bill 227 departs from each of
the other bills because it does not mandate a cap for compensatory or punitive
damages. 150
As evident, each of the bills provides a slight variance on what the bal-
ance should be concerning discrimination claims under the MHRA. The
main difference between the bills is that House Bill 227 does not provide for
capped compensatory and punitive damages - a big factor when deciding to
adjudicate claims in court. It becomes apparent, however, that while Daugh-
erty may be abrogated in the future, jury trials are likely here to stay.
142. See Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 296.010-.070 (1978) (repealed 1986).




147. See S. 852, 95th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2010); H.R. 799, 95th
Gen. Assem., Ist Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2009).
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IV. DISCUSSION
As any historian would surely approve, the analysis of the proper future
for employment discrimination in Missouri begins with a detailed look into
its past. This process inherently requires a critique of the propriety of each
speed bump in time - whether the commendable decisions of the past have
come to be the errors of today. Particularly, a lack of judicial error in the
application of the Act would logically point to the legislature for resolution of
any problems that may exist. Determining any potential error or problem is
best made through separate analysis of the parts, culminating into an exami-
nation of the whole.
A. The Pieces of the Pie
1. The Right to a Jury Trial
The first major change to the MHRA within the last decade arose from
the Supreme Court of Missouri's determination in State ex rel. Diehl v.
O'Malley that a right to a jury trial exists for claims under the MHRA for
monetary damages. 5 ' As described above, this involved an analysis of the
Missouri Constitution's provision that states, "[Tihe right of trial by jury as
heretofore enjoyed shall remain inviolate . . . ."152 This provision has been
interpreted as providing the same right to a jury trial to "the class of cases to
which it was then applicable" under common law at the time of the 1820
adoption of the Missouri Constitution.153 Because equitable actions did not
include a constitutional right to a jury at common law, there is no comparable
constitutional right today.154 On the other hand, actions at law, such as claims
for pecuniary relief, included a right to a jury trial under common law and,
therefore, include such a constitutional right today.' 55  Accordingly, it is
proper for claims for monetary damages under the MHRA to have a right to a
jury trial in Missouri.
Since a jury is available for claims of monetary relief under the MHRA
by constitutional mandate,156 it is important to understand the impact of such
a right. This inquiry can be broken down into two questions. First, what
151. 95 S.W.3d 82, 84 (Mo. 2003) (en banc).
152. MO. CONST. art. 1, § 22(a).
153. De May v. Liberty Foundry Co., 37 S.W.2d 640, 648 (Mo. 1931).
154. Wolf v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 263 S.W. 846, 847 (Mo. 1924) (en banc).
155. Meadowbrook Country Club v. Davis, 421 S.W.2d 769, 772 (Mo. 1967) (en
banc) ("The only relief sought in the instant case was the recovery of a money judg-
ment so that it was an action at law and, therefore, fell within the scope of the consti-
tutional guarantee of the right of trial by jury.").
156. As identified previously, this right still exists when simultaneously seeking
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impact does a jury have on the likelihood of a plaintiff succeeding on the
merits? And second, if the plaintiff is successful, how does a jury impact the
relief granted? Each question will be discussed in turn.
Sources suggest that the "popular" view among legal professionals and
the public in general is that juries tend to be pro-plaintiff in that they are more
likely to find liability for claims than a more experienced, less empathetic
judge.157 Of course, this general view varies depending on the type of claims
involved; many believe personal injury actions with large and powerful de-
fendants will find less sympathy in a jury than other actions with more relata-
ble defendants. However, studies show that this view is only sound in
theory. According to one comprehensive study by Kevin M. Clermont and
Theodore Eisenberg, plaintiffs as a whole do not fare better before juries,
with any variance in the win rate resulting from considerations beyond a
judge or jury trial, such as the average win rate for a given type of case.'5 9
Essentially, those cases that do well before a jury also do well before a judge,
and vice versa.160 A synthesis of multiple studies also determined that al-
though juries may be more willing to find liability for corporate giants over
family-owned shops, juries may actually have an anti-plaintiff bias due to a
strong cautiousness about frivolous lawsuits and a general belief of over-
litigiousness in our society.
The same general belief exists for juries' treatment of compensatory and
punitive awards: juries become emotionally involved and award outrageous
damages.162 This belief is also unsupported by empirical evidence. A study
between jurors and experienced legal professionals (including arbitrators,
lawyers, and past judges) determined that there is no significant difference in
the calculation of damages between jurors and those who have considerable
legal experience.163 Other studies further support this conclusion.' 6 Howev-
157. See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Trial by Jury or Judge:
Transcending Empiricism, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1124, 1127 (1992).
158. See id at 1128.
159. Id. at 1134.
160. Id. at 1138.
161. Valerie P. Hans & Stephanie Albertson, Empirical Research and Civil Jury
Reform, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1497, 1507 (2003).
162. See id. at 1512 (pointing out that the media plays an important role in this
belief, as only the most extreme jury awards generally reach the public eye).
163. Neil Vidmar & Jeffrey J. Rice, Assessments of Noneconomic Damage
Awards in Medical Negligence: A Comparison of Jurors with Legal Professionals, 78
IOWA L. REV. 883, 896 (1993). While this study involves medical malpractice, which
presents numerous considerations, it is indicative of a lack ofjuror bias. See id.
164. See, e.g., Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Determining Punitive Damages: Empirical
Insights and Implications for Reform, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 103, 200 (2002) ("[I]t is not
clear that decisions by juries differ dramatically from those of judges.").
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er, occasional cases such as Kimzey v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., where a jury
awarded $50,000,000 in punitive damages, tend to skew public perception. 165
Regardless of any disparity between popular beliefs and actual practice,
the stereotypical personal belief among attorneys plays a direct role in their
settlement efforts. In fact, an analysis of approximately 700,000 cases deter-
mined that of the general settlement rate of 26.6% for trials, cases in which a
jury trial is demanded are 5.5% more likely to settle than those without a
jury.166 Considering all of the elements involved in a settlement, the popular
belief concerning the judge-jury distinction is undoubtedly a subliminal factor
that directly correlates with the probability of receiving relief.
With all of these factors, it is clear that the option for a jury trial in
MHRA monetary claims is a significant benefit for plaintiffs. Regardless of
generalized empirical studies that negate widely held beliefs, plaintiffs may
still find an impartial jury more attractive than a seasoned judge. Whether the
specific claim is shaky or the particular litigator has an uncanny ability to
connect with jurors, the availability of a jury is an important factor in any trial
strategy. This is especially true when the common belief that juries are more
willing than judges to award damages in discrimination cases - whether ac-
167
tually supported or not - will have a direct impact on settlement efforts.
Other changes in the past decade have further impacted MHRA adjudication.
2. The Daugherty Standard: Discrimination's Contribution
The plain and unambiguous language of the provision defining discrim-
ination as "any unfair treatment based on [a protected status]"168 clearly sug-
gests that the legislature did not intend to require that an employment action
be completely motivated by a discriminatory animus. Instead, consistent with
the holding in Daugherty v. City of Maryland Heights,169 it plainly appears
only to require a showing that discrimination was present in (or contributed
to) the employment decision. What, though, does the distinction between
motivating and contributing actually mean?
One possibility is displayed in an example by Feme P. Wolf in the legis-
lative review subcomnmittee of the Missouri Bar.170 In this example, Ms.
Wolf points out that the motivating factor standard may preclude liability
165. 107 F.3d 568, 570 (8th Cir. 1997).
166. Joni Hersch, Demandfor a Jury Trial and the Selection of Cases for Trial, 35
J. LEGAL STUD. 119, 127-28, 140 (2006). While this study involves cases from the
federal docket, its display concerning the effect of jury trials on settlement efforts in
the minds of litigators is likely analogous to civil disputes. See id. at 138.
167. See Hansen, supra note 4, at 304 (identifying why plaintiffs prefer jury tri-
als).
168. Mo. REV. STAT. § 213.010(5) (2000) (emphasis added).
169. 231 S.W.3d 814, 819 (Mo. 2007) (en banc).
170. Memorandum from The Missouri Bar to Representative Edgar G. H. Emery
& Representative Tim Jones 3-4 (Feb. 25, 2009) (statement of Ferne P. Wolf).
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under the MRA if an African American was denied employment because of
his race and because he went to the University of Missouri.' 7 1 While it can
be argued that the person's race may not have purely motivated the decision
not to hire, it surely contributed to it. However, at least one Missouri court
held that the change in terminology is a distinction without a difference. 72In
doing so, the court looked to Title VII's definition of "motivating" as "play-
ing a part or playing a role in the decision" 73 for persuasive guidance.174
Since the definition of "motivating" and the plain meaning of "contributing"
are synonymous according to the court, each standard has the same threshold
inquiry. 75
Nonetheless, the abolishment of the McDonnell Douglas analytical
framework has a clear implication: plaintiffs have a lower burden of produc-
tion to survive summary judgment. As an initial matter, moving away from a
burden-shifting analysis makes sense. Under the contributing factor standard,
once the burden shifts to the employer to proffer the reason, or determinative
factor, behind the employment decision, that proffered reason does not itself
resolve the issue of whether there was a discriminatory contributing factor. If
anything, it merely determines what the employer considered most in its deci-
sion, not the absence of a contributing discriminatory factor. The federal
framework is thus a possible source of confusion and a waste of resources.
Yet, the federal framework does have merit. It ultimately serves to flush out
the issues for the case and provides additional clarity in the process of evi-
dence production. Due to an employer's fear of various tort actions such as
defamation, many plaintiffs are provided with little to no reason for their ul-
timate termination;176 shifting the burden to the defendant provides this rea-
son, even though it may be pretextual.
Beyond the initial threshold of a motion to dismiss and summary judg-
ment, the promulgated MAI 31.24 may also have an impact on the jury. For
instance, even though Title VII defines "motivating" in a similar fashion as
"contributing," this may conflict with the typical understanding of jurors. In
fact, motive is generally defined as "[s]omething, esp[ecially] willful desire,
that leads one to act."' 77 This definition suggests that motivation is about the
determinative factor that brings about an action. Motivation in an employ-
ment law context, however, is concerned with whether discrimination merely
played a part in the action. Labeling the standard as "contributing" provides
171. Id.
172. See McBryde v. Ritenour Sch. Dist., 207 S.W.3d 162, 170 (Mo. App. E.D.
2006).
173. 8TH CIR. MODEL CIVIL JURY INSTR. § 5.96.
174. McBryde, 207 S.W.3d at 170 (emphasis omitted).
175. Id.
176. See Robert A. Prentice & Brenda J. Winslett, Employee References: Will a
"No Comment" Policy Protect Employers Against Liabilityfor Defamation?, 25 AM.
Bus. L.J. 207, 209, 225 (1987).
177. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1039 (8th ed. 2004) (emphasis added).
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additional clarity by bringing the substantive effect of the standard in line
with its plain, literal meaning.
As a whole, it appears that the Missouri General Assembly intended to
provide a right of action for a greater amount of discriminatory actions under
the MHRA. By implementing a contributing factor standard and instruction,
clarity is provided to the adjudication of claims in Missouri. Furthermore, the
abandonment of the McDonnell Douglas framework provides additional clari-
ty and makes the summary judgment threshold easier to survive. The plain-
tiff need only produce sufficient evidence - whether direct or circumstantial -
to show a genuine issue of material fact in order to survive summary judg-
ment; there is no shift in the burden of production.1 78
3. Individual Liability
The provision defining an employer to include "any person directly act-
ing in the interest of an employer" 79 plainly indicates that the Missouri legis-
lature intended to extend liability beyond the organizational level. The Su-
preme Court of Missouri's holding in Hill v. Ford Motor Co.180 definitively
affirmed this observation. This is more apparent when recognizing that the
MRA does not make reference to agency law, which led federal courts to
imply solely respondeat superior liability under Title VII.' 8 ' Therefore, un-
like Title VII, it is clear that supervisors,182 chief executive officers,' 83 and
similar positions are subject to liability under the MHRA. While the Su-
preme Court of Missouri's holding of individual liability is a matter of statu-
tory interpretation, the underlying issue remains whether it is good policy to
hold individuals directly liable.
Most commentators do not doubt the necessity of vicarious liability, un-
der the doctrine of respondeat superior, to hold principals (employers) liable
for the acts of their agents (employees). 8  Such liability typically provides
plaintiffs access to deeper pockets, with many organizations holding greater
178. ITT Commercial Fin. Corp. v. Mid-Am. Marine Supply Corp., 854 S.W.2d
371, 376 (Mo. 1993) (en banc) ("Summary judgment is [appropriate] ... where the
moving party has demonstrated, on the basis of facts as to which there is no genuine
dispute, a right to judgment as a matter of law." (citing Mo. SUP. CT. R. 74.04)).
179. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 213.010(7) (2000).
180. 277 S.W.3d 659 (Mo. 2009) (en banc).
181. See, e.g., Gastinaeu v. Fleet Mortgage Corp., 137 F.3d 490, 494 (7th Cir.
1998).
182. Hill, 277 S.W.3d at 662 (holding that a supervisor can be liable under the
MHRA).
183. See Cooper v. Albacore Holdings, Inc., 204 S.W.3d 238, 244 (Mo. App. E.D.
2006).
184. Tammi J. Lees, Note, The Individual vs. The Employer: Who Should Be Held
Liable Under Employment Discrimination Law?, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 861, 878-
79 (2004) (identifying common arguments).
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wealth than their individual agents.185 In addition, it is the organization that
delegates authority to its agents and is, therefore, the most effective entity for
deterrence.'8 It alone has the ability to provide relief such as reinstatement
or promotion. However, in the end, these arguments provide little value for
the determination of whether individual liability itself is warranted.
Proponents of individual liability universally argue that individual liabil-
ity provides further deterrence of discrimination to those who actually com-
mit the improper actions.187 In effect, the personal fear of liability - a direct
cause and effect - is the only real way to achieve significant steps toward
eliminating discrimination. Directly holding the individual responsible for
the improper action' 88 similarly serves to vindicate the victims of discrimina-
tion by punishing the actual wrongdoers and increases the likelihood that
victims will bring legal action, further fortifying deterrence principles.189
And while plaintiffs are entitled to only one "satisfaction" in that they cannot
recover twice from both an employer and individual for one discriminatory
act, suits against both parties provides additional protection against an insol-
vent defendant.190
Opponents, however, downplay many of these arguments. In essence,
opponents state that many of the above concerns are adequately represented
by solely providing vicarious liability.' 9' In particular, employers that are
held liable will logically discipline those employees that caused such liability,
providing deterrence to both parties as well as eventual retribution. Further,
many courts find the minimum employee requirements for organizations in-
consistent with the concept of individual liability: why require organizations
to have six or more employees when individuals can be liable? 92 Lastly, it is
possible, and even likely, that the benefits of individual liability could be
moot, as many employers may ultimately indemnify the liable employees. In
some cases, the employer may even be legally required to do so out of the
principles of agency.
185. Id. at 878.
186. Rebecca Hanner White, Vicarious and Personal Liability for Employment
Discrimination, 30 GA. L. REV. 509, 544 (1996).
187. See Worth, supra note 80, at 960-61.
188. As noted in Part IIA, supra, this action can include actions that "aid, abet,
incite, compel, or coerce the commission" of the prohibited acts. Mo. REV. STAT. §
213.070(1) (2000).
189. Lees, supra note 184, at 880-81.
190. See id. at 886-87.
191. See Lenhardt v. Basic Inst. of Tech., Inc., 55 F.3d 377, 381 (8th Cir. 1995);
Worth, supra note 80, at 959-60.
192. See, e.g., Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1993)
(finding such inconsistency to make individual liability "inconceivable").
193. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 438 (1958) (identifying situations
in which a principle must indemnify an agent).
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Regardless of the various arguments surrounding individual liability, an
important issue is whether Missouri truly wishes to impose liability on indi-
viduals. Saying, "It won't happen to me; I'm not racist or sexist" is not en-
tirely convincing. For instance, a study into "attribute substitution" by Chris-
tine Jolls at Yale Law School displayed how people make unconscious heu-
ristic decisions based not on cognitive thought, but upon familiarity and what
most easily comes to mind. 194 The study revealed that even people fully
committed to diversity take actions showing implicit and automatic bias to-
wards various groups. 195 In essence, discriminatory actions are not always
out of maliciousness but instead can result from heuristics - mental shortcuts
developed over time.196 If a person associates more with persons of his or her
particular race, his or her heuristic mental process subconsciously associates a
favorable view of that race over other races.' 97 Interestingly, however, the
study also revealed that those people in highly diverse environments showed
the least amount of implicit bias.' 98 With these concepts in mind, the possi-
bility of liability attaching to individuals applies to every person, regardless
of his or her conscious views.
In sum, each of these arguments for and against individual liability has
merit. If the intended effect of the MHRA is the reduction of as much dis-
criminatory behavior as possible regardless of cost, including individual lia-
bility is likely warranted. However, these costs may be significant, especially
when considering that punitive damages may be a consequence of subcons-
cious, not malicious, heuristic behavior. Perhaps this determination is best
made through analysis of the Act as a whole.' 9 9
4. Constructive Discharge and Continuing Violations
The application of the "continuing violation" doctrine to MHRA claims
ultimately serves to expand the total amount of claims recoverable in Mis-
souri. The doctrine essentially allows the aggregation of continuing miscon-
duct by a defendant, thereby tolling the applicable statute of limitations and
allowing recovery for actions that otherwise would be barred. 200 This doc-
trine has achieved widespread acceptance - and confusion - in federal
194. See Christine Jolls, Behavioral Economics Analysis of Employment Law 30
(Oct. 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.law.yale.edu
/documents/pdf/Faculty/JoilsBehavioralEconomicsAnalysisofEmploymentLawI-18-
10.pdf.
195. Id. at 31.
196. Id. at 29.
197. See id. at 30-33.
198. Id. at 32-33.
199. See discussion infra, Part IV.B.
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courts.201 Because MHRA claims look to consistent federal law for guidance,
it is likely that many of these federal principles will be applicable.202
While the equitable nature of the continuing violation doctrine appears
to make fundamental sense in that not all discriminatory behaviors culminate
in employment actions, the actual application of the doctrine is difficult. It is
widely regarded as "one of the most confusing and inconsistent areas of em-
ployment discrimination law."203 Due to this, many scholars argue between
the relative merit of the doctrine and other approaches that are available, such
as simply extending the statute of limitations for the claims. 2 04 While the full
debate is beyond the scope of this Note, the implications of the doctrine are
clear: more employment discrimination claims reach Missouri courts.205
B. Putting It Together: The Optimal Balance
With the analysis of the individual aspects and changes of the last dec-
ade complete, it is possible to fully examine the Act as a whole and determine
what may be the optimal balance. Because each part of the whole is inter-
connected in the adjudication of MHRA claims, the parts as a whole can
create more complexity than if separate. Furthermore, since the proposed
amendments currently before the House or Senate are potential changes rec-
ommended by legislators, they will be a common theme throughout this in-
quiry. This is especially important because, as previously discussed, the judi-
cial interpretations of the Act have been proper. Change, if desired, must
come from the legislature.
The current law under Title VII serves as one example of a potential sta-
tutory framework for discrimination. The essential aspects are as follows.
Claims for pecuniary relief such as compensatory and punitive damages are
206
entitled to a right to jury trial. Yet, the right provided by Title VII comes
with a drawback in that damages are capped from $50,000 to $300,000, de-
pending on the employer size.207 The federal claims are also subject to the
208McDonnell Douglas framework under a motivating standard. Thus, Con-
gress found it beneficial to counter the availability of a jury with a limit on its
201. See id at 273.
202. See Daugherty v. City of Maryland Heights, 231 S.W.3d 814, 818 (Mo.
2007) (en banc).
203. Lisa S. Tsai, Note, Continuing Confusion: The Application of the Continuing
Violation Doctrine to Sexual Harassment Law, 79 TEX. L. REV. 531, 531 (2000).
204. See id at 559.
205. For further insight into this debate, see supra note 200 and accompanying
text.
206. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c) (2006).
207. 42 U.S.C. § 198la(b)(3).
208. See supra Part II.C.
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discretion to impose damages. House Bills 1488 and 799 as well as Senate
Bill 852 provide a similar framework to Title VII. 2 09
Early commentary about the post-amendment MHRA suggested that it
was amended to provide an additional option to plaintiffs' attorneys beyond
that of Title VII.2o The option was to provide an alternative from Title VII's
jury trial and capped damages: a plaintiff can escape capped damages by sac-
rificing the ability to present factual issues before a jury.211 The underlying
theory, consistent with the common perceptions identified earlier,212 is that
some situations call for additional compensatory or punitive damages and
judges are the most capable parties to make such a determination. This ap-
proach, if true, would negate any belief that amending the MHRA was to
extend protection to employees beyond that already afforded under existing
federal counterparts. Instead, it was to provide a different package of costs
and benefits for a plaintiff s consideration.
Consequently, it is not surprising that many people called for amend-
ment after the determination that the right to a jury trial was constitutionally
213
required. Two attorneys in particular, Paul Seyferth and Joseph Knittig,
214
made a proposal for amendment. Their basic argument called for the gen-
eral assembly to maintain the structure of the prior act (bench trial without
caps) via the creation of an administrative adjudicatory body in which plain-
215tiffs could elect to pursue remedy under the MHRA. In doing so, plaintiffs
would not have a constitutional right to a jury, and would have limited op-
tions for appeal to circuit courts.216 This approach, according to the attor-
neys, would neither change the adjudication of claims under the MHRA, nor
be unconstitutional.2 17
Yet, it is not clear whether the original balance of a bench trial without
caps is necessarily warranted in Missouri. For instance, the major concern
against a jury awarding excessive damages is mitigated by the empirical data
identified above suggesting that juries are capable of properly determining
218damages, as well as judicial adjustments on appeal for outliers. This even-
tually happened in the Kimzey case when the $50 million punitive damage
209. See H.R. 1488, 95th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2010); S. 852, 95th
Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2010); H.R. 799, 95th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess.
(Mo. 2009).
210. See Seyferth & Knittig, supra note 26, at 308. While the original MHRA
was enacted before Title VII, this discussion is considering the 1986 amendments. Id.
at 312-13.
211. See id at 307-08.
212. See discussion supra Part IV.A.1.
213. See, e.g., Seyferth & Knittig, supra note 26, at 315-16.
214. Id. at 316-22.
215. Id. at 317.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. See supra notes 162-65 and accompanying text.
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award was reduced to $350,000 on appeal.2 19 In fact, any lower court award
of damages can be reviewed for an abuse of discretion on appeal, providing a
safety mechanism against egregious awards beyond trial-level protections
such as remittitur.220
These same mitigating principles equally apply to damages against indi-
viduals. Simply replacing a judge with a jury for factual determination and
the award of damages does not take away a judge's power to prevent errone-
ous behavior. Allowing claims against individuals does, however, provide an
additional procedural detriment to defendants. Plaintiffs will be able to stra-
tegically destroy complete diversity by adding in-state individuals - those that
actually work within the state - as defendants in conjunction with the out-of-
state corporations.221 Actions once freely removable to federal court can now
be easily pinned in state courts. This is of great concern for national corpora-
tions with a small local presence seeking to escape potential local bias by
tapping a federal venire. Even with this concern, most states have nonethe-
less found individual liability beneficial enough to expressly provide for it. 222
It is simply the most effective deterrence against discrimination - it attacks
the source. Furthermore, any existence of heuristic bias may even support
individual liability in that both the organization and the individual will be
compelled to ensure that all employment actions lack potential intrinsic dis-
crimination.
Considering all of the factors, it appears that many of the commonly
cited fears and concerns about the MHRA's aggressive assault on employ-
ment discrimination are uncertain and likely overstated. While the infrequent
outliers touted by the media support the perception that juries will lead to
excessive liability and damages, extensive studies suggest that juries serve as
223
effective adjudicators. 2 Accordingly, any exorbitant award of damages that
survives review by the trial judge and a subsequent abuse of discretion deter-
mination by an appellate court could logically be awarded by a judge in the
first place. In addition, public policy supports the more recent changes such
as continuing violations and individual liability, as described above.224 These
principles require that individuals be cautious of their actions, which is con-
sistent with many areas of the law.
Since a variety of factors mitigate many of the concerns posed by the
current MHRA, a remaining issue is whether the MHRA should be a state-
level counterpart of Title VII or whether it should go above and beyond that
offered by other statutory regimes in order to deter discrimination. As a
whole, many scholars have increasingly been dissatisfied with the anti-
219. Kimzey v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 107 F.3d 568, 577-78 (8th Cir. 1997).
220. See id at 577.
221. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2006) (outlining the federal diversity requirements).
222. Lees, supra note 184, at 866-67.
223. See supra notes 157-65 and accompanying text.
224. See supra Part IV.A.3-4.
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discriminatory effect and relief of Title VII.225 Whether due to the empirical
showings that the standards of Title VII result in a surprising amount of dis-
missals or because of the inherent difficulty of proving discriminatory ac-
tions, the additional protection against discrimination is beneficial with minor
additional cost. The Missouri General Assembly was thus proper in rejecting
the recent proposed amendments that sought to mirror Title VLL.2 2 6
Of course, if the legislature subsequently determines that the Act creates
consequences beyond those intended, amendment may be necessary in the
future. If individuals consistently face excessive damages, the legislature
may consider providing damage caps for individual liability. If corporations
consistently face excessive damages under the Daugherty standard, the legis-
lature may provide both security and additional benefit by capping damages
above the Title VII amounts. If the continuing violation doctrine creates in-
comprehensible confusion, the legislature may expressly abrogate its use and
extend the statutory time limit. These are all for time to tell. At this point,
the current acts of discrimination simply outweigh the current concerns in
Missouri.
V. CONCLUSION
Absent specific evidence of an unknown societal detriment, amending
the MHRA would only serve to weaken Missouri's stance against employ-
ment discrimination. There is no doubt that the changes in the last decade,
including the right to a jury trial, the Daugherty contributing standard, indi-
vidual liability, and continuing violations have greatly expanded the scope of
protection provided by the MHRA. As with any other employment-related
act, the Missouri legislature must be diligent in analyzing its effects on the
interests of the employer and the employees, whether intended or not. With-
out evidence suggesting that a flux of unsubstantiated and frivolous claims is
overwhelming employers, the employees' strong interest against discrimina-
tion supports the current balance of the MHRA. In the end, employers have
protection in their ability to implement a strong and comprehensive policy
225. See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, Employment Discrimina-
tion Plaintiffs in Federal Court: From Bad to Worse?, 3 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 103,
104-05 (2009) (detailing how the low rate of success for employment discrimination
suits is deterring the use of the court systems for relief); Kevin M. Clermont et al.,
How Employment-Discrimination Plaintifs Fare in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 7
EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 547, 547-48 (2003) (study showing that employment-
discrimination plaintiffs "swim against the tide," compared to the typical plaintiff);
Michael Selmi, Why Are Employment Discrimination Cases So Hard to Win?, 61 LA.
L. REV. 555, 556-57 (2001) (arguing that plaintiffs are unsuccessful due to mispercep-
tion and bias about employment discrimination).
226. See H.R. 1488, 95th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2010); S. 852, 95th
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against discrimination; employees only have the extra protections of the
MHRA.
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